The following article details the ongoing Operation 1027 campaign in northern Myanmar, as described to the author by members of Myanmar’s People’s Liberation Army familiar with the conflict. It is the latest in a series of articles written by the author on the ongoing civil war in Myanmar.
Previous articles may be found here and here.
It is the author’s understanding that the commander interviewed for this article was briefed beforehand by the spokesman of the Communist Party of Burma.
Shots Fired
On 27 October 2023, a coalition of anti-junta forces from six separate armed groups launched a coordinated offensive in Kokang, a region in Myanmar’s northeastern Shan State. The principal factions, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Arakan Army (AA)—referred to collectively as the Brotherhood Alliance—with support from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA), and People’s Defence Force (PDF). Together, they deployed a united front of more than 10,000 soldiers in Kokang: Operation 1027.
As Operation 1027 continues to unfold, the author met once again with Cde. Champo, a veteran of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), and Cde. Thet, a PLA Commander leading a battalion of soldiers in the 2nd front, nothern Sagaing region.
News from the Front
The interview began with the author asking if the CPB or its armed wing, the PLA, have heard the news regarding ongoing hostilities in Palestine, and if so, what their analysis of the situation would be. The Commander confirmed that the PLA is aware of the situation, and stated proudly: “the PLA stands with the Palestinian people.”
Moving on to the business at hand, the Burmese comrades were eager to share the latest news from the front lines of Myanmar’s Kokang region: more than 200 junta outposts have been liberated throughout the region, and, in a first-of-its-kind development since the summer revolution began, the PLA has been charged with the management of a township near the Chinese border. Until now, the PLA’s warfighting strategy has relied primarily on mobile tactics rather than the conquest of territory—a slight shift indicating the strategic value of the region, and of the evolving situation.
Detachments from PLA-2 and PLA-9 have been deployed to Kokang region in support of Operation 1027.
Battle footage captured on 15 November shows PLA commandos engaging with junta forces; "We shot at each other for almost the whole morning, but there was no damage on our side," one soldier noted—there are frequent skirmishes.
The PLA was likewise able to confirm a TNLA letter dated 19 November claiming that chemical weapons had been deployed against coalition forces near the Chinese border, as well as a video of the incident sent to the author by Chinese netizens. “It was like a test”, the elder Champo said.
Most notably, the comrades claimed that the Brotherhood Alliance’s surging victories throughout the region have been—at least in part—thanks to the deployment of some 4,000 drones. It remains unclear where the coalition forces could have procured them from.
Why We Fight
The Comrades elaborated further on the exact causes and reasons for the operation, which appears as a dramatic escalation in Myanmar’s ongoing civil war.
Most immediate, they claimed, is the proliferation of junta-aligned, armed criminal gangs in the region. While a Chinese-led crackdown on telecomm fraud and other forms of criminality has indeed been ongoing, the Myanmar junta’s noted involvement with the brutal gangs as an illicit money-making venture was a crime that cried out for vengeance. With border crossings in Kokang falling one by one to coalition forces, the gangs, they say, are being cleared out. It is believed that some 15-50 Chinese agents were murdered by the Kokang junta-gangs in October.
Most importantly for the Brotherhood Alliance is the liberation of their own ethnic lands that had been under junta occupation. In previous conflicts, Kokang had been a hotbed of Communist support due to the Party’s commitment to self-governance for the country’s many minority ethnic groups; when the Party went underground, the region became home to one of the Party’s many offshoots, the MNDAA. In 2009, despite promises from the previous junta government ruling the country at that time, the Kokang Self-Administered Zone (under control of the MNDAA) was seized by junta forces. Now, they say, it is time to take it back from the junta-gangs and return it to the Kokang people.
For the Communist Party and its armed wing, the PLA, returning to what was once one of their strongest regions of support is a triumphant homecoming. Amid rumors of their longstanding relationship with China having survived beyond the 20th century, it might also be a great strategic breakthrough.
Wave by Wave
When asked what the PLA’s plans were for the coming month and year, the Commander smirked. “Wave by wave”, he remarked, in reference to a popular slogan raised by the Communist Party at the time of launching Operation 1027. “The waves of revolution”, he says, will continue to come, subside, and rise again; the Kokang coalition will extend the liberated zone across the border areas, and then, once secure, will reach into the interior of the region. By the end of this year, Laukkai—capital city of Kokang—will once again be in the hands of the people.
Once the liberation of Kokang is complete, they will move to the next wave—wave by wave, first along the border areas, and then inland. “Upper to lower. Wave by wave.”
Shortly after the interview concluded, the embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Myanmar issued an official warning for all Chinese citizens to immediately evacuate the city of Laukkai.
“May all our enemies tremble.
May all our people be happy.
People's Liberation Army battalions are already fighting alongside our allies.”